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Cuba Stronger Today Than in '62 Crisis Year

In an earlier column, I revealed that the historic 1962 "agreement" between President John F. Kennedy and Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev over Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba was never a real agreement, and certainly not the ironclad understanding the American public believes has existed for the past 21 years.

The State Department has covered up this situation, even withholding from top White House officials the secret documents that chronicle the delicate U.S.-Soviet negotiations in the fall of 1962.

My associate Dale Van Atta has seen secret and top secret papers that show that the situation today is no better—and in some respects is worse—than when the missile crisis took the world to the brink of nuclear war.

The Soviets have many more offensive weapons in Cuba—and far more sophisticated ones—than the 42 medium-range ballistic missiles that touched off the 1962 confrontation.

Faced with a determined president and a clear American military

superiority, Khrushchev reluctantly agreed not to deploy the missiles he had planned for Cuba and removed those in place. But he balked at the U.S. insistence that the Soviets also pull out the IL28 "Beagle" bombers on the island.

In a secret letter to the Soviets, U.N. Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson listed the weapons the United States considered to be offensive in nature. The list specifically included bombers.

In a Nov. 5, 1962, memo to the president, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy reported on a meeting with Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin. He said he had told the Soviet that "certainly it was very clear that the bombers, the IL28s, had to go."

But Khrushchev did not agree. Secretary of State Dean Rusk sent Stevenson these top secret instructions on Nov. 7:

"Soviets take position that Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement related only to missiles.... Our primary purpose is to get the MRBMs [medium-range ballistic missiles] and IL28 bombers out, and we would go far in reducing the list of offensive weapons in order to achieve this purpose."

On Nov. 20, Khrushchev wrote to President Kennedy, complaining that during their exchange of correspondence in October the president had not made "a single mention of bomber planes . . . I informed you that the IL28 planes are 12 years old and by their combat characteristics they at present cannot be classified as offensive types of weapons."

Khrushchev then added that "we intend to remove them within a month" anyhow, so the United States should call off its quarantine of Cuba. After some stalling, the Soviets did remove the bombers and the U.S. quarantine was then lifted.

But the sad fact is that the Soviets now have more and better warplanes in Cuba than they did in 1962. They have a dozen Tu95 "Bear" bombers, some with strategic nuclear capability, and they have about 40 MiG23 or MiG27 fighter-bombers, the latter capable of carrying nuclear bombs. In secret testimony to Congress, top intelligence officials admitted that the United States has no reliable way to tell if the Soviet planes actually have nuclear weapons.

Delivery of at least six nuclear missiles by submarine was verified in 1972 and 1974, and the Cuban naval base of Cienfuegos is known to be linked by rail to a nuclear warhead storage facility.

Sens. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) and Steve Symms (R-Idaho) have rightly raised questions about what they believed were Soviet violations of the 1962-agreement.